2018-04-03 IMI
This article appeared in the author’s WeChat public account (ID: Honghaochinastrategy) on March 28, 2018.
Hong Hao, Senior Research Fellow of IMI, Managing Director and Head of Research, BOCOM InternationalIncreasingly belligerent rhetoric; 1987 once more? Over the weekend, the propaganda in China has turned increasingly acrimonious. The People’s Daily said China is “not afraid of a trade war”. A senior government official postulated a scenario of levying tariffs on US soy bean at the China Development Forum. During an interview with Bloomberg, China’s Ambassador to the US mentioned that “all options are considered” when asked whether China would reduce purchases of US treasury bonds. Despite the confluence of negative headlines, the US market opened higher on Friday, but sold off aggressively during the late trading session.
On the morning of July 2, 1987, Japanese viewers watched in shock nine US congressmen smashing Toshiba radio with sledgehammers on Japanese television. The showdown was because Japan violated the bilateral agreement by selling eight computer-guided multi-axis milling machines to the former Soviet Union.
This incident was largely ignored by the US press. Less than two months later, the US market peaked, and then saw an epic plunge on the Black Monday. This is the seldom-discussed catalyst of the historic stock market crash in October 1987.
Striking similarities between the trade disputes in 1987 and now: In the 1980s, spectacular advances by Japan in various high-tech fields, such as steel, automobiles, machine tools and semis, raised the specter of losses in the corresponding American industries. Americans’ fear was aggravated by Japan’s exalted progress towards an “Information Society” as a new form of nationalism.
Leading on the frontier of science and technology, the “techno-nationalism” was giving Japan some new-found confidence. After all, Japan is a nation that had long coped with a strong sense of insecurity because of its limited natural endowment of small geography, frequent earthquakes and tsunami, and post-war vulnerability due to the lack of nuclear arsenal.
In 1987, Japan had risen from a protected protégé of the US to a leading creditor nation of the world. The American trade deficit was US$167 billion, of which US$58 billion was with Japan. The country was recycling the USD it received from exports to buy US treasury, helping to depress the US treasury yield.
The US congress quickly produced a trade bill of 2000-plus pages aimed at protecting the domestic market and forcing opening markets abroad, as well as limiting Japanese investments and forcing opening Japanese markets. Reciprocity and “a level playing field” were the key themes.
Meanwhile, Japan published and then elaborated the Maekawa Report in 1987. The report called for stimulating domestic demand, reducing dependence on exports, coping with outrageously high land prices, improving housing and lowering trade barriers. Sounds familiar? Recently, even the major stock market indices, such as the Hang Seng Index, have been showing an eerily similar trajectory as the Dow in October 1987, right before the Black Monday (Chart 1).
While we concede that many a technical chart of such startling nature can be drawn, the similarities between historical precedents and stock market movements are intriguing. It is worth taking a note.
The PBoC’s balance sheet growth is set to slow; RMB strength will ease.The PBoC has a new governor and a new party secretary. Consensus believes that policy continuity is thus ensured. But we think the central bank’s policy depends more on the underlying business cycle than on its personnel, and tends to be counter-cyclical. With the progress of reining in shadow banking and deleveraging, the central bank’s balance sheet growth will slow, concurrent with China’s three-year economic cycle. (Please see our report “A Definitive Guide to China’s Economic Cycle” on 2017-03-24, and “A Definitive Guide to China’s Economic Cycle Part II – New High” on 2017-08-28). Concurrently, the RMB will likely weaken, if history is a guide (Chart 2-3). There is a possibility that such potential cyclical weakening of the RMB can be misconstrued as an act of trade war.Large-cap turnover approaching extreme; market still fraught with risks: While the market’s pessimistic reflex may be tempting for some to bottom fish, we note that market visibility in the near term remains clouded. In our note “The Year of the Dog: Lessons from 2017” (2018-01-30), we warned of an impending market sell-off. We suggested we would wait till the volatility subsided before re-establishing our positions, and the market may have seen its high of the first half of 2018. In our follow-up note “Markets in Crisis” (2018-02-06), we cautioned against being too hasty to catch falling knives.Despite the current weakness in the Dollar, emerging markets and commodities were still sold off during the recent market turmoil. The Dollar appears to have broken down, and its weakness is more a reflection of the US fiscal strain, rather than abundant dollar liquidity. Recent surging LIBOR, as well as the widening LIBOR-OIS spread are all hinting at the same structural problem. That is, a traditional risk haven is no longer there (Chart 4). We will consider only China’s treasury bonds and gold.An escalation of disputes will fundamentally change the outlook of global growth, which now appears peaking, and elevate inflation pressure. If such a worst-case scenario happens, all bets are off. Consensus is focusing on the 200-day moving average as the line in the sand of technical support. Moving averages are friends of a continuing trend, but are blind to inflection points. Large caps’ turnover is once again approaching extremes that had historically portended the peak of the SSE50 index (Chart 5). Consensus also points to solid US fundamentals. But in 1987, the real US GDP growth was 3.4%, and the US didn’t sink into recession until 1991. In an environment with dwindling macro liquidity, the trades that used to have momentum behind their sails will likely see reversal. The stronger the momentum has been previously, the more potent and more likely the reversal now. We cannot pin our strategy on a few technical averages that are moving with hindsight.