尹睿哲：从融资分层到竞争中性：成因与对策（中英双语）
年初以来，信用债市场掀起阵阵“违约潮”，其中，民营企业“雷区”属性尤其突出，无论是违约数量还是违约规模，占比均过半。疾风骤雨之下，债市投资者对民企债“避之不及”，部分机构甚至采取“一刀切”的做法，民企信用利差几乎触及历史峰值。债市的情况是整个融资体系的“缩影”，民企不仅通过债券融资困难重重，在信贷等其他渠道亦举步维艰。国企、民企“二元结构”似乎重现，整个融资体系呈现“分层”的状态。这种情况因何而起？政策变局之下，未来又能有何破解之策？
客观上说，银行对中小企业“歧视”并非中国独有，而是各国均普遍存在的难题。不过，眼下的“融资分层”仍有一些值得探讨的“特殊性”，我们从以下两个角度理解这一现象的成因。
首先，冰冻三尺非一日之寒，隐患在前两轮“宽信用”中早已埋下伏笔。过去十年中，中国一共经历了三轮完整的信用“扩张-收缩”周期，除了在第一轮信用扩张过程（2008-2009年“四万亿刺激”）中民企获得了不少信贷支持外；在后两轮信用扩张中，民企均面临了与当前类似的“信贷歧视”，不过彼时能仰仗股权和非标渠道融资。
具体来说，在2011~2012年的信用扩张周期中，非标资产粉墨登场，由于能够给予更高的风险溢价补偿，成为托底民企负债的主要力量。在2014~2015年的信用扩张周期中，“大资管”接力信托通道为民企“输血”；叠加权益市场进入牛市，股权融资也起到了明显的作用。
福祸相生，具体到今年的情况，由于过往非标融资在民企负债中占比已经较高，而资管新规导致表外融资（过去民企重要的“替代融资渠道”）进入存量崩塌过程，民企负债接续压力大幅上升；加之权益市场持续低迷也难有贡献，使得信贷可得性问题在当前环境下显得尤其突出。
其次，金融机构也并非主观偏见，民企基本面的确有不尽如人意之处。如果仔细比对民企部门与国企部门的基本面情况可以发现：
第一，民企营收降幅快于国企，二者增速差在2017年一季度就开始拐头，但成本降幅却慢于国企，两相挤压之下，民企部门利润增速始终弱于国企，在低位徘徊。
第二，采用（财务费用+汇兑损益）同比观测利息净支出，民企部门所承担利息支付规模和增速仍然高于国企部门，虽然今年年中微降，但水平偏高。
第三，民企部门资产减值损失增速触及新高，贷方科目计提应收账款和存货减值准备的企业不在少数；前者是应收账款账期进一步拉长后的恶果，后者则是规模扩张与需求匹配失衡的尴尬体现。
最终反映到资产负债率层面，民企与国企出现显著分化。2015年供给侧改革推行以来，国有企业部门杠杆率稳中有降，而民企部门杠杆水平不降反升，现已接近2012年以来高点。不仅如此，民企负债中还存在明显的“期限错配”情况，短期债务占比显著高于国企。今年二季度，民企三大现金流净额之和触及2008年以来的最低点，迎来“至暗时刻”。
形势固然严峻，但所幸从政策层面，我们已经观察到非常明显的“拐点”信号。年初以来，货币周期率先拐头，“宽货币”已然确认；7月以来，“宽货币”基础上“宽信用”政策进一步推出。与以往不同的是，本轮“宽信用”的对象并非政府（基建）和地产部门，而是聚焦在民企部门。央行行长易纲在答记者问时提出国企“竞争中性”原则；随着最高级别的民营企业座谈会举行，相关民企信用缓释政策如“潮水”般涌出。
我们认为，政策意在避免对民企融资的“一刀切”，而非简单的系统性兜底。所谓竞争中性，意味着将更多从“好企业、坏企业”的视角去区分融资主体，而非从“国企、民企”的视角去区分。结合前文对“融资分层”成因的剖析，潜在对策包括：
第一，进一步对资管新规进行放松，恢复部分表外融资功能。以相对高收益补偿民企债权持有人，以弥补表内信贷对民企的“天然厌恶”。
第二，对表内部分而言，修正商业银行资产质量指标监管，以抬升风险偏好，满足民企融资诉求。
第三，鼓励信用风险缓释工具（CRM）发行，通过“信号效应”使部分优质民企凸显出来，避免系统性“一刀切”。
英文原文如下：
Private-sector financing to get needed boost
Yin Ruizhe
30 Nov 2018
Bond market skepticism has made credit access difficult, but new policies can offer turning points.
Since the beginning of this year, there have been a series of defaults in the credit debt market. Whether in volume or size, private companies are responsible for more than half of these defaults. Under this circumstance, bond market investors are reluctant to lend money to private companies, and some institutions even try to avoid it. It is not only that it is difficult for private companies to get financing in the bond market, but also from other financial channels.
To be honest, it is not only in China that banks are cautious about lending money to small and medium-sized companies. The difficulty of financing for private companies is common across the world. But China's current situation is still worth pondering, and there are mainly two reasons for this phenomenon.
First, the hidden danger was made apparent a long time ago. In the past decade, China has experienced three rounds of credit expansion and contraction. In the first round of credit expansion, 4 trillion yuan ($575 billion; 509 billion euros; ￡451 billion) was put into the market as an economic stimulus and a way to deal with the global economic crisis in 2008, giving private companies much credit support. But in the other two rounds, private companies didn't gain much support and also had difficulties in getting financing, like what is happening now.
Second, private companies themselves also have some problems, especially when compared with Stated-owned companies. The decrease in revenue for private companies is faster than that of the SOEs, and the decrease in cost for the private companies is slower than that of the SOEs. Thus, the increase of the profit of the private companies is weaker than that of the SOEs, and has been staying at a low level. The size and growth of interest that private companies are paying are both still higher than SOEs, and are at relatively high levels.
So if we look at the assets to liabilities ratio, there are significant differences between the private companies and the SOEs. Since the launch of supply-side reform in China in 2015, SOEs' leverage ratio has stayed steady and has slightly lowered, but that of the private companies has increased, and almost reached a peak since 2012. Moreover, private companies have more short-term debt than SOEs. In the second quarter of 2018, the net cash flow of private companies reached the lowest point since 2008.
Although the situation is still tough, from the policy side we can see signs that there might be turning points. Since the beginning of this year, monetary easing has been confirmed, and since July, credit easing policies have been put forward. And different from what we saw before, this round of credit easing targets private companies instead of governmental infrastructure projects or the real estate industry. With more high-level signals on boosting the development of private companies being released, relative credit easing policies for private companies will continue coming out.
I think the policies should advocate that bond markets differentiate financing entities from the perspective of whether they are good companies, rather than whether they are private companies or SOEs.
The author is a researcher with the International Monetary Institute of Renmin University of China. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.