David Marsh：主权基金考虑建设“安全网”跨境通道缓解金融震荡
主权基金正在仔细衡量与国际机构进行更广泛合作的好处，如国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行（World Bank）等，以鼓励跨境资本流动，促进可持续增长，尤其是在新兴市场。
提高跨境融资来源的可靠性和增加国际和区域“安全网”（safety net）的建议可能会鼓励新兴市场经济体加快构建并保持相对开放的资本流动体系。通过开放的资本市场和提高投资回报率，这些建议符合主权基金的利益——面对全球政治不确定性，也有助于恢复市场活力。
有观点认为，新兴市场经济体长期资金供应者间应扩大合作。这种观点在亚洲已经被接受，认为合作能够克服国际金融“突然中断”（sudden stops）的威胁，比如1997-98年亚洲金融危机以及欧元区债务危机。唐纳德·特朗普总统“美国优先”（America first）的态度可能进一步加深了这种忧虑。
一个主要主权基金称，如果对“外国投资者见好就来，见不好就跑”的担忧少一些，新兴经济体面对危机将不会那么脆弱。
这些主题形成了新兴市场经济体规则的一部分，特别是在亚洲地区，较少依赖于同美国的纯双边关系和布雷顿森林体系中的机构，更多的向多边流动开放。3月22日，亚洲开发银行（the Asian Development Bank）和国际货币金融机构官方论坛（OMFIF）共同组织了东京研讨会，旨在发展资本市场，以支持新兴经济的金融稳定和增长，上述的一些观点在此次会议的一个研讨会上受到了广泛关注。
此举可以扩大亚洲和中东地区大型投资机构的国际投资范围。这些都是外国市场上（包括邻国）的重要机构投资者。
亚洲“自力更生”运动发生的部分原因是，亚洲地区对于20多年前应对亚洲金融危机所采取的高压措施耿耿于怀。对于增加亚洲经济体量的愿景也反映了过去西方危机十年来亚洲经济增长的相对稳定性，以及亚洲各国中央银行和主权基金持有的官方资产的迅速增长。
1997-98年亚洲的动荡伴随着东南亚各国一连串的货币贬值。IMF和美国政府协同采用的救援措施引发了激烈的批评——一方面因为加剧了危机，另一方面，美国和欧洲在十年后那场横扫大西洋的金融危机中面临同样的问题时，西方社会并没有采取这些措施。
IMF对东南亚采取的强硬手段包括坚持自由市场原则，如汇率完全自由浮动、禁止资本管制、大规模预算削减和允许银行倒闭。印度尼西亚、泰国、韩国（腹诽或多或少）还有马来西亚等国对此积怨颇深但马来西亚成功抵制了IMF的限制，还因为引进资本管制，引起了华盛顿方面愤怒。
这一事件在亚洲的残留影响包括当地不愿意在需要的时候从IMF筹集资金、积累外汇储备以提高自身对抗危机的能力以及在面临新兴市场的挑战时，更多寄望于地区而非全球的解决方式。
后者包括名为“清迈地区储备资金汇集和危机抵御倡议”，尽管该倡议在实践中从未使用过。措施清单延伸到了中国主导的亚洲基础设施投资银行和新开发银行的设立，挑战了IMF和世行在全球舞台上的主要地位。
原文如下：
Sovereign funds are weighing the benefits of co-operating more widely with multinational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to encourage cross-border capital flows and foster sustainable growth, particularly in emerging markets.
These suggestions for increasing the reliability of cross-border sources of finance and adding to international and regional ‘safety nets’ could encourage emerging market economies to speed up and maintain relatively open systems for capital flows. They would be in the interest of sovereign funds by contributing to open capital markets and raising investment returns – and would be beneficial by reinforcing market resilience in the face of worldwide political uncertainties.
Ideas for greater concertation between long-term suppliers of funds to emerging market economies are gaining ground in Asia to overcome the threat of ‘sudden stops’ in international finance which marked the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis as well as upsets in the euro area. President Donald Trump’s ‘America first’ attitude is likely to promote further such considerations.
The perceived vulnerability of emerging economies to crises would fall if concerns abated that ‘foreign investors come in good times and go in bad times’ – as one major sovereign fund put it.
These themes form part of the precepts for making emerging market economies, especially in Asia, less dependent on purely bilateral ties to the US and the Bretton Woods institutions, and more open to multilateral flows. Some of these tenets were circulating at a seminar in Tokyo on 22 March organised by the Asian Development Bank and OMFIF on developing capital markets to support financial stability and growth in emerging economies.
Such moves could widen the international scope of large investment institutions in Asia and the Middle East. These are highly important institutional investors in foreign markets, including among their neighbours.
A campaign of Asian ‘self-reliance’ has been driven partly by lingering resentment over what the region considers to be heavy-handed solutions to the Asia crisis 20 years ago. Desire for increased Asian weight reflects, too, the relative resilience of Asian economic growth during the past decade of problems for the West, as well as the rapid build-up of official assets held in the continent’s central banks and sovereign funds.
The 1997-98 Asian upheavals accompanied a series of currency devaluations in southeast Asia. Rescue measures orchestrated by the IMF and US government led to intense criticism – both for exacerbating the crisis and for not being followed by the West when the US and Europe faced comparable problems during the transatlantic financial upsets 10 years later.
The hard-line IMF treatment of southeast Asia included an insistence on free market principles such as complete exchange rate flexibility, prohibition of capital controls, large-scale budgetary cuts and acquiescence in bank failures. Rancour came from countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea, which more or less acquiesced, and Malaysia, which successfully resisted IMF strictures and incurred Washington’s wrath by, for example, introducing capital controls.
The lingering effects in Asia include both local reluctance to raise funds from the IMF at times of need, a move to accumulate foreign exchange reserves to boost self-insurance against crises, and desire for regional rather than global solutions to emerging-market challenges.
The latter includes the so-called Chiang Mai initiative for regional reserve pooling and crisis mitigation, though it has never been used in practice. The list of measures extends to the China-led creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank that challenge the primary position of the IMF and World Bank on the global stage.