导读：
中央银行的最终目标是通过制定并实施货币和金融监管政策来提高人们的福利。这项权力在央行法律中以不同方式阐释。在这些倡导保持央行独立性的法律框架下，是时候再次通过货币融资的方式弥补财政赤字了。在实施时只要把握分阅读全文
中央银行的最终目标是通过制定并实施货币和金融监管政策来提高人们的福利。这项权力在央行法律中以不同方式阐释。在这些倡导保持央行独立性的法律框架下，是时候再次通过货币融资的方式弥补财政赤字了。在实施时只要把握分寸，并将其作为央行和财政部门之间商定合作的一部分，货币融资就能在经济衰退期间有效促进经济增长和就业。
一些央行有多重目标，例如美联储的目标就是“有效促进最大就业、价格稳定和合适的长期利率”。无论这些目标在一级法律中如何表述，央行都必须支持增长和就业，尽管央行的主要目标是追求价格稳定。2008年后许多国家的经验表明，在这些目标中保持谨慎的平衡十分困难。
虽然货币当局和财政部门的合作在当今流行的倡导央行独立性潮流下有所减弱，但它们之间的合作却是至关重要的。况且，独立性绝不意味着排除这种有益的合作。
央行独立性的部分原因在于需要为货币融资设定安全限额。但不幸的是，二战后货币融资被贴上“邪恶”的标签，且无论在任何情况下都会遭到反对。
的确，过多的货币融资导致了许多国家出现恶性通货膨胀：比如20世纪的德国和南斯拉夫，以及21世纪的津巴布韦。但在另一方面，20世纪30年代初，日本成功依靠货币融资战胜了经济萧条。
欧洲和日本的量化宽松政策未能推动通货膨胀、促进经济增长的其中一个可能原因是（非债务创造）货币融资在总体量化宽松中所占的比例较低。按照目前的情况，中央银行作为政府的银行，货币融资会导致公共债务积累。但1986年诺贝尔经济学奖得主詹姆斯·布坎南表示，“要购买尚未就业的资源所提供的服务，有效手段是通过货币的通货膨胀”。其建议创造货币，而不增加中央银行的债务。这将由以下方式进行：资源转移到财政部门，使其承担创造就业的支出，且不增加公共债务。
要想实现这一点，可以使政府成为货币发行者、中央银行成为分销商。在现行制度下，央行发行纸币，这些纸币成为央行的债务，由国库券和政府债券等金融资产支持，公共债务遂得以提高。如果政府直接发行各种面值的纸币，这将会成为央行的资产，因为央行必须从政府手中购买纸币。这种机制将为政府提供直接的名义铸币税收益，而非增加政府债务。
虽然用这样的方式缓解赤字已经过时，尤其是在发达国家，但正如凯恩斯在1923年所著《货币改革之路》中提到：“虽然谴责这种方法，但从某种程度上来说，也必须承认它的效力。凯恩斯在1923年所著《货币改革之路》中提到：“虽然谴责这种方法，但从某种程度上来说，也必须承认它的效力。
这些重要的信号不容忽视。我们需要开展新的研究，来判断凯恩斯所说的某种“程度”——在何种程度下货币融资有益而无害。在得出正确的评估之后，中央银行和财政部门需要打破常规，在全球经济困难时期实施有助于促进增长和就业的政策。
原文如下：
The ultimate objective of central banks is to increase the welfare of people through designing and implementing monetary and financial regulatory policies. This mandate is captured in different ways in central bank laws. Within the framework of these laws, many of which justifiably set down the doctrine of central bank independence, it's time to consider again the idea of monetary financing of government deficits. As long as this is not practiced excessively, and is carried out as part of agreed co-operation between the central bank and the fiscal authorities, monetary financing has a valid role in promoting growth and employment during downturns.
Some central banks have multiple objectives, like the Federal Reserve, which is required to 'promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates'. No matter how the objectives are written in the primary legislation, central banks must support growth and employment, even if they are primarily pursuing the objective of price stability. Maintaining a prudent balance between these objectives is difficult, shown in many countries' post-2008 experience.
Coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities is crucial, yet this has become weaker with the modern approach to central banks as independent institutions. However, independence in no way precludes such useful co-operation.
The shift to central bank independence was motivated partly by the need to set safe limits on monetary financing of deficits. Unfortunately, post-second world war thinking has progressed to the stage where all monetary financing has been labelled as an evil, to be opposed whatever the circumstances.
It is true that excessive monetary financing has caused hyperinflation in many countries: Germany and Yugoslavia in the 20th century and Zimbabwe in the 21st century are examples. Japan, on the other hand, successfully followed this path in the early 1930s to fight depression.
One possible reason why quantitative easing in Europe and Japan has failed to lift inflation and growth is that the share of (non-debt-creating) monetary financing in total QE is low. In line with the current central bank role as banker to the government, monetary financing results in the accumulation of public debt. However, according to James Buchanan, 1986 Nobel Prize winner in economics, 'The efficient means of purchasing the services of unemployed resources is through inflation of the currency'. Buchanan proposed creating money without increasing the liability of a central bank. This would be controlled by the way resources are transferred to fiscal authorities for undertaking employment-generating development expenditures, and without increasing public debt.
This can be done if government becomes the issuer of currency and the central bank becomes the distributor. Under the existing system, banknotes are issued by central banks, which become their liabilities backed by financial assets like Treasury bills and government bonds that raise public debt. If governments directly issue all denominations of currency notes, these will become assets of central banks, since central banks must purchase these from governments. This mechanism will provide direct nominal seigniorage revenue to the government, instead of increasing government debt.
This approach to financing fiscal deficits is out of fashion, especially in advanced countries. But it is not new. Keynes acknowledged this in A Tract on Monetary Reform in 1923 in these words: 'The method is condemned, but its efficacy, up to a point, must be admitted.'
These important signals cannot be ignored. We need new research to estimate Keynes' 'point' up to which monetary financing is not only harmless, but beneficial. And then we need central banks and governments which are willing to defy convention and implement policies that could help promote growth and jobs at a difficult time for the global economy.