Andrew Large：各国央行权力面临回收风险

近来各国央行一直处在动荡的第一线——它们面临着愈加严峻的挑战，尤其是唐纳德川普当选后的美国。审视过去，在全球性的金融危机爆发之后，人们期望各国央行更加明智地承担起增加的责任，更加明确其在调控中可及和不可及的目标，更坚定地指出经济结构性政策或政府财政性政策应与货币政策更适配。 如果央行无法胜任这些挑战，它们手中的权力就面临着被政府收回的风险。 各国央行应表现出它们谦虚的姿态。即使货币政策已经成功实现了众多调控目标，并且在金融危机爆发后恢复金融体系稳定方面也取得了部分成绩，但当前很多情况已超出央行和众人的理解范围。另外，央行也需要改进其与社会民众的沟通策略，它们必须要激发社会信心。为了实现这一点，它们应该保持严谨，仅向社会传达它们确信自己能够实现的方面。 在民主体制下，将权力交付给非选举官员总让公众感到不安，各国央行行使权力时也面临同样的问题。然而央行，作为权力的行使代表去承担最后贷款人的职责，一直以来都被看作是合法的。 在20世纪的后期，货币政策一直属于央行的职责范围内并被赋予了政治合法性，基本原因有二。一是因为央行在通胀和价格稳定等方面政策实施的结果是可以被大众观察到，也是可以被度量的，因而央行被看作是对此负责任的。第二，人们认为让具备必要的经济专业知识的部门去执行货币政策，会提升货币政策的效果。 对于政客或者任何尝试承担这项职责的团体来说，授权央行以服务政治为目的行使权力是更合宜的选择。然而，这份共识在美国、欧元区、日本和英国遭到很多阻力。 第一个原因与央行的职权范围的扩大有关。过多的权力会引来众怒，如此一来央行离失败也就不远了。尽管各辖区的政策管辖范围各不相同，但现今一国央行的政策范围通常包括复杂金融部门的审慎管理，消费者和市场的行为，最重要的是承担起维护金融稳定的责任。 承担维护金融稳定的职责就要制定宏观审慎政策为早期风险预警并减轻威胁；银行、其他金融机构以及金融基础设施要更稳固、更有弹性；确保如果风险真的发生，这些机制能够及时发挥作用减轻震荡和损失。 现今一个大问题是金融稳定程度并不像价格和通胀那样可以度量。等到央行明白政策失误时就为时已晚。规避这种失误的代价是巨大的。而且，各国央行面临复杂的金融体系，混乱和政策冲突如影随形，威胁着各国央行的信誉度。 阻碍央行行使权力的第二个原因在于零利率甚至负利率带来的复杂局面。旨在使通货膨胀回到目标水平的政策尝试使得央行很难实现他们的初衷。量化宽松政策使得资产价格错乱，结果是用一个群体的损失换取另一个群体的收益。另外，量化宽松几乎属于财政层面，这通常是属于政府官员而非央行的权力。 第三，宏观审慎政策的选择不可避免地会有特定的影响，这比货币政策中的利率政策有过之而无不及。比如，房屋购买者或他们的贷款方可能会受到相应的影响。在没有确凿证据表明有必要采取行动的情况下，政府官员会听取群众的反对意见。 第四个原因是民粹主义的兴起。这种运动倾向于反对当权派，质疑其专业性，并且认为其政策具有政治动机。拥有人民委托权力的央行也无法从这些指责中幸免。 一个很大的问题依旧存在：谁能把这份工作做得更好？没有人认为价格稳定、通胀和金融稳定不重要，事实正好相反。政客们可能会认为他们能让事态变好，但是历史数据却并不支持这种看法。所以，央行要继续承担这项工作，且不断让自身愈加娴熟地克服日益复杂的工作挑战。 英文原文 Mastering the challenges of enlarged mandates Central banks risk being stripped of their powers by Andrew Large
Tue 15 Nov 2016 Central banks have been in the firing line lately – and the challenges will grow more severe, especially in the US, after the election of Donald Trump. In retrospect central bankers would have been wiser, upon taking on increased mandates after the global financial crisis, to be more assertive about what they could and could not achieve. They should have been firmer in pointing out where structural or governmental fiscal measures would have been preferable to monetary actions. If central banks fail these challenges, they risk governments stripping them of their enlarged powers. Central banks need to demonstrate some humility. Although much has been achieved in monetary policy, and since the global financial crisis in financial stability as well, there is much that neither central banks nor the rest of the world understand. Moreover, central banks need to improve their communications strategies. They must inspire confidence. To do this they should be careful only to communicate what they know they can achieve. In democracies, there is always tension over placing power in the hands of unelected officials. This extends to the authority exercised by central banks. However, the delegation of powers has long been regarded as legitimate for the traditional central bank function of acting as lender of last resort. In the latter decades of the 20th century, monetary policy came within central banks’ remit, and was accorded political legitimacy, for two basic reasons. First, central banks could be held accountable, since the results of policy actions in terms of inflation and price stability were observable and measurable. Second, it was understood that monetary policy would improve if conducted by those with the requisite economic expertise. The trade-off of giving central banks delegated powers, with objectives set by politicians, was seen as preferable to politicians or any other party trying to do the job. However, this consensus has come under strain in many jurisdictions including the US, the euro area, Japan, and the UK. The No. 1 reason concerns the widening of central banks’ mandates. 'Too much power' raises hackles and makes central banks targets for perceived failures. Although varying across jurisdictions, policy areas now within the formal ambit of central banks include prudential regulation of a complex financial sector; conduct of both customers and markets; and, most significantly, responsibility for underpinning financial stability. The latter requires policies for macroprudential activity designed to provide early warnings and mitigate threats; being satisfied that banks and other financial institutions and infrastructure are stronger and more resilient; and ensuring that, if there are failures, the mechanisms are in place to reduce their impact and cost. One big problem here is that financial stability outcomes cannot be measured as price stability and inflation can. Central banks don't know if they have failed until it is too late. The costs of avoiding failure can be substantial. Additionally, where central banks are dealing with complex financial systems, the danger of confusion and policy conflict is ever-present – threatening damage to central banks’ overall credibility. A second reason for the strains is the complications stemming from interest rates at zero or below. Policy actions intended to get inflation back to target have demonstrated that central banks are finding difficulty in achieving their remit. Quantitative easing has introduced asset price distortions that have benefited some at the cost of others. Moreover, QE comes ultimately closer to a fiscal dimension which is normally the prerogative of politicians, not central banks. Third, macroprudential policy choices inevitably have selective impact, perhaps more so than interest rates in the case of monetary policy. For example, home-buyers, or their lenders, may be selectively affected. And where people object, in the absence of hard evidence that the actions were necessary, politicians will listen. The fourth reason is the rise of populist politics. Such movements tend to denigrate the establishment, decry its expertise, and suggest that its policies are politically motivated. Central banks with their delegated powers are not exempt from these rebukes. One big nagging question remains: Who could do a better job? No one is suggesting that price stability, inflation and financial stability do not matter: quite the opposite. Politicians may feel that they can somehow do better, but the historical record is not on their side. So central bankers need to continue with their central mandates, while becoming more adept at mastering the challenges that accompany their increasingly complex jobs.