米罗斯拉夫•辛格Miroslav Singer:通货膨胀——央行行长的一次机会,决策者宜回归传统论点

通货膨胀的压力正再一次笼罩全球经济，这已成为一种愈来愈强烈的共识。 若这种形势更加明显，央行行长们可能需要紧缩货币政策，并停止使用非常规手段来宽松货币政策。 许多国家的政客都不大可能会欢迎这种紧缩，唐纳德·特朗普就是其中之一。 紧缩的货币政策会使美元走强，鉴于这会降低美国制造业的竞争力，从而有悖于 他提振美国制造业的承诺，因此特朗普可能并不愿意看到强势美元。在欧元区， 一些成员国家因金融部门脆弱、欧元区体制建设仍未完成，非常规政策的退出对 于他们而言便更加复杂。随着复苏步伐加快，劳动力市场疲软的缓解以及欧元区 较大产出缺口逐渐收窄都将加剧通货膨胀的压力。 而上述变化都有一个共同的背景——大众对精英阶层（包括央行行长）的怨 恨引起了许多主要经济体政治组成的变化，因而中央银行可能会发现自己的政治 地位在下降。预计将会有众多提议允许通货膨胀超过其目标值，甚至施加压力提高目标值。 但是央行在通货紧缩期间不会降低目标值，也就是说他们不愿意放松中期预测。 按照这一逻辑，央行行长也不应听取类似提高通胀目标的提议。否则，他们将“顺 周期”行事，这将从根本上否认中央银行的独立性。 然而，最近当选的政客，如特朗普，以及其他一些新晋政客，如右翼政客法 国的马林·勒庞和荷兰的基尔特·威尔德斯，都属强硬派。政客和央行行长之间 的争论愈演愈烈。 从短期来看，我们期待中央银行能提出更多的正统论据，说明为什么有必要维持低通货膨胀率。而且，如果中央银行能够解释为什么有必要采取非传统政策(如量化宽松)来避免通货紧缩的威胁，这对于他们来说必将是近期很大的进步。 中央银行多年来在这类对话中一直表现得相当高效。而且，在这种环境下，常规的货币政策工具会更加有效。中央银行应光明正大地回归更加传统的货币政 策，他们更适合运用传统货币政策工具参与到相关争议的讨论。 原文如下：

Inflation: a chance for central bankers

Return to traditional arguments will suit policy-makers

The consensus that inflationary pressures are returning to the global economy grows ever stronger. If this becomes manifest, central banks may need to tighten monetary policy and end the use of unconventional tools for easing monetary policy. Politicians in many economies are unlikely to welcome this tightening. Donald Trump, for one, would not relish the associated strengthening of the dollar, as it  would reduce the competitiveness of the US manufacturing sector that he promised to revive. In the euro area, the fragile state of some members’ financial sectors and unfinished euro area institution-building are likely to complicate withdrawing from unconventional policies. As the recovery gains pace, the erosion of labour market slack and the narrowing of the euro area-wide output gap will exacerbate inflationary pressures. This is all happening in a setting where popular resentment against elites – among  whom  central  bankers  are  certainly  counted  –  is  changing  the     political make-up of many major economies. Central banks may find themselves attractive targets for political point-scoring. It is reasonable to expect a host of proposals to allow inflation to rise above targets, and possibly even pressure to increase the targets. The same logic that prevented central banks from lowering targets during the deflationary period, namely their reluctance to loosen mid-term expectations, should prevent central bankers from heeding such advice. Otherwise, they would act procyclically, which would negate the ultimate reason why they are independent. Still, politicians who have been recently elected, like Trump, and others who are proving popular, such as right-wing figures Marine Le Pen in France and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, tend toward stridency. Politicians and central bankers face increasingly candid squabbles. In the short term, expect more orthodox argument among central banks about why it is necessary to keep inflation low. That will be a great improvement over  recent times when central banks found themselves explaining why it is necessary to use unorthodox policies like quantitative easing to avoid deflationary threats. Central banks have shown themselves over many years quite efficient in this type of dialogue. Moreover, in this environment, conventional monetary tools are more efficient. Central banks will rightly welcome a return to more traditional monetary policy. Operating the instruments for these circumstances, and taking part in the associated arguments and discussions, will suit them much better.