贲圣林：民主信念被动摇了吗？ ——英国脱欧对全球治理的损害
英国 “脱欧”的后果正在全球范围内发酵。这一事件表明，英国人仍遵循传统智慧的指引——即认为全民公投才是终极意义上良性且有效民主治理体系。英国向来被认为是“西式民主”的先锋与典范，而“脱欧”公投本该是一次民主体制优越性的彰显。
然而，“脱欧”已经对英国乃至世界造成了不可挽回、不可修复的伤害。随之而来的是，民众对于近乎神圣的民主体制的信心有所动摇。
当今，发达国家和发展中国家间的主要分歧表面上看在于经济体制不同，但事实上还有一种分歧在于对全民选举权的不同看法。在许多西方国家，民主时常被认为是经济发展的灵丹妙药。但在脱欧一事上，民主似乎擦枪走火。如果民主在英国有可能误入歧途，对于民主制度的生存土壤还不那么完善的威权政府领导和人民来说，实施民主的风险会高的无法承受，在此情况下民主议程很有可能被搁置乃至背弃。
当然，有些人会说，脱欧公投及其政治余波所暴露的并不是民主制度本身的问题，只是制度运行的缺陷。一个可以引用的例子是政治上的“代理问题”：政治家们将某项议题诉诸全民公投，以此逃避责任。事实上这类议题并不适合直接投票，而应由选举产生的代表决定。再者，如果全民投票是必需的，政治家们应该对机制进行调整，确保像脱欧这类关键性议题不是由简单多数决定，还要设立更为严格的程序，并使之受到制衡。
无论公投的长期影响如何，我们必须研究其对英国乃至世界更为直观的后果。许多人认为脱欧是一个“黑天鹅”事件，完全出乎意料也无法想象。
面对严酷的现实，我们需要回答一些颇具挑战性的问题。首先是，英国目前的国家形态能否延续？苏格兰和伦敦这些地方的离心力是否会聚集起势，从而引发英国分裂并导致其影响力大减？历史是否会重新轮回到“前大英帝国时代”，英格兰将成为一个独立的国家？这些答案不仅会决定历史学家如何评判“倒霉”的前首相戴维·卡梅伦，还将会有更深远的影响。
第二个问题是，欧盟本身是否会分崩离析，回归其“核心国家”联盟的原本形态？届时欧盟的规模和全球影响力将会大减，但这也许能增强其内部凝聚力。可以说近几年欧盟扩张的速度一直很快，过分注重合并规模，而忽视成员国之间的内部协调。现任的欧盟领导人比以往任何时候都更迫切地需要重新检视外部扩张与内部凝合之间的平衡，确定欧盟形态的最佳规模，并找到一条合适的战略发展路径。
第三个领域是地缘政治。无论第一和第二个问题的进展如何，“欧洲”不管作为一个概念还是一个实际运作的国家联盟，其全球影响力都将被削弱。这将改变世界的格局，对美洲来说获利较大，亚洲其次。
除去这些直观结果，英国脱欧的反响远远不止于此。对于国际社会来说，重新划分“治理”的意识形态，这一层间接影响可能更为深远。这些后果未来都将不断地在国际地域间回响。
With consequences unfolding around the globe, Britain's departure from the European Union has been guided by the conventional wisdom that democracy, ultimately expressed through a referendum, is a good and effective system for governance. Britain is held out as the pioneer and standard-bearer of 'western democracy'; the EU vote was supposed to show how a democratic system functions.
However, Brexit is likely to wreak irreversible and irreparable damage to Britain and the world. So, as an important by-product, the outcome will shake popular faith in the 'sacred' system of democracy.
A principal fault line between developed and developing countries appears to lie in divergences between economic systems. But there may be another one in the form of different views on universal suffrage, often considered a panacea for economic development by many in the West. With Brexit, democracy seems to have backfired. If democracy can go terribly wrong in Britain, the risk of this happening in many less-ready-for-democracy countries may become unbearably high for their authoritarian leaders and their people at large, prompting them to hesitate with or backpedal on democratic initiatives.
Of course, some people will argue that 23 June and the aftermath displayed shortcomings not of the system itself, but simply of how it was exercised. One can cite the 'agency problem' in politics: elected politicians tried to dodge their own responsibility by calling a referendum on a decision that is not suitable for popular vote and should be made by elected representatives themselves. A further argument would be that, if a popular vote is required, politicians should fine-tune the system to ensure that key decisions such as leaving the EU are made not just through a simple majority but through a more rigorous procedure subject to greater checks and balances.
Whatever the referendum's longer-term implications, we have to investigate its more immediate impact, on the UK and further afield. Many consider Brexit as a 'Black Swan' event, previously unexpected and unthinkable.
In confronting harsh reality, we need to answer some challenging questions, first, on whether the UK in its current shape will survive. Will centrifugal forces in places like Scotland and London gather so much momentum that the UK will be dismembered and diminished into a much less important nation? Will history make a full circle by returning to the era of a pre-British Empire, with England as a standalone entity? The answers will determine much more than simply how harshly historians judge David Cameron, the luckless former prime minister.
The second issue is whether the EU itself will fall apart and retreat to the original union of 'core countries', reduced significantly in size and global influence, perhaps enhanced in internal cohesion. Arguably the EU has been expanding too quickly and has focused unduly on amalgamation interns of size, instead of internal harmonization among member nations. EU leaders now, still more urgently than before, must re-examine the balance between external expansion and internal cohesion, assess an optimal size for the Union, and find the right strategic path for the future.
The third area is in geopolitics. Whatever the exact progression of the first and second sets of circumstances, 'Europe', both as an idea, and as a functioning body of nations, will be weakened on the world stage. This will change world dynamics, probably in favour of America and to a lesser extent Asia.
The overall repercussions extend well beyond such direct impacts. The indirect international effects, through a redrawing of ideological concepts of governance, may turn out to be still more profound. The results will reverberate around the international landscape, for years to come.